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ABSTRACT 
This research introduces and adapts the 25 techniques of Situational Crime 
Prevention for use in counterinsurgency operations. These techniques are based 
on a set of powerful theories within the fields of Environmental and Situational 
Criminology. Situational Prevention is a strategy that addresses specific crimes, 
or insurgent activity, by managing, designing, and manipulating the environment 
in a manner that seeks to increase the risk to the insurgent, while reducing the 
insurgent’s potential reward for committing the act. The 25 techniques offer a 
practical means to apply these theories to the reality of counterinsurgency 
operations. Use of the 25 techniques would expand the repertoire of preventive 
countermeasures, and enable a security force to intervene in the causal chain 
events to prevent or reduce the occurrence of insurgent violence and crime. 
These techniques originate from five core principles: increasing effort, increasing 
risk, reducing rewards, removing excuses, and reducing provocations. 
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The purpose of this research is to introduce the theories and techniques of 
Situational Crime Prevention, and then hypothesize that they are applicable for 
use in counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency techniques should be 
the practical application of good theory. Regrettably, theory is often considered 
irrelevant to security forces when conducting counter insurgency operations. 
Criminologists Marcus Felson and Ronald Clarke, in their publication, 
Opportunity Makes the Thief, argue this irrelevance likely comes from attributing 
insurgency solely to political, religious, or socioeconomic factors. Unfortunately, 
these factors are often beyond the purview of counterinsurgent, and therefore, 
often have little practical application.1  
Opportunity theories within criminology could bring theoretical relevance to 
counterinsurgency operations. Opportunity theories emphasize five principles 
and 25 techniques that can be implemented at all levels of conflict to reduce 
insurgent violence and crime.  
These techniques are derived from the following three theoretical 
approaches: routine activity theory, crime pattern theory, and the rational choice 
perspective. Felson and Clarke say these theories build on the old adage that 
“opportunity makes the thief.” In counterinsurgency operations, these theories 
build on David Kilcullen’s concept of the “accidental guerilla.” These theories, 
principles, and techniques are described in this research, which theorize that the 
techniques can be used to reduce insurgent opportunities, and thereby, reduce 
insurgent violence, crime, and the number of accidental guerillas.2 
                                            
1 Marcus Felson, R. V. G. Clarke and Great Britain. Home Office. Policing and Reducing 
Crime Unit, Opportunity Makes the Thief : Practical Theory for Crime Prevention (London: Home 
Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 
1998), 1. This introduction is modeled from Felson and Clarke’s introduction and extended from 
criminology to counterinsurgency. 
2 Ibid. 
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A. BEHAVIOR IS A FUNCTION OF BOTH THE PERSON AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Individual behavior is a function of both the person and the environment. 
This is one of the most well known principles in social psychology, and is referred 
to as Lewin’s Equation. Lewin’s Equation is often expressed in the symbolic 
terms of, B = f (P, E). Most counterinsurgency theories focus primarily on the 
person, and discount the situational factors within the environment that turn an 
insurgent’s motivation into action.3 
Insurgency is a form of behavior, and as such, is also governed by Lewin’s 
Equation. Insurgent behavior depends upon the conjunction of motivation (of 
whatever nature and whatever source) with opportunity (whether defined in terms 
of risks, efforts or rewards of the act).4 
Lewin’s Equation shows the importance of the immediate situation in 
understanding an insurgent’s behavior, rather than relying solely upon their past 
experiences. The causal effect that the environment has on insurgent behavior is 
evidenced by the fact that no attack can take place without overcoming the 
physical requirements to execute it. 
Conversely, the majority of people with strong political or religious 
grievances do not take up arms against the state, and many of the people that do 
participate in a rebellion, belong to the upper or middle class.5 At this time, no 
theory exists that is based upon what always leads the person to an insurgency, 
but situational opportunities within the environment are always necessary for 
insurgent activity to occur. 
Insurgent violence and crime are, in part, a result of situational 
opportunities within the environment. By approaching insurgent acts of violence 
                                            
3 "Field Theory—Kurt Lewin," http://wilderdom.com/theory/FieldTheory.html. 
4 R. V. G. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2006). 
5 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 48. 
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as politically motivated crimes, they can be prevented or reduced through the 
application of the 25 techniques of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). These 
techniques originate from five core principles: increasing effort, increasing risk, 
reducing rewards, removing excuses, and reducing provocations.  
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II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELEVANCE OF 
SITUATIONAL PREVENTION IN COIN 
Situational crime prevention is a strategy that addresses specific crimes, 
or insurgent activity, by managing, designing, and manipulating the environment 
in a manner that seeks to increase the risk to the offender, while reducing the 
offender’s potential reward for committing the act.6 
Situational crime prevention is informed by theory, and as stated earlier, 
has Lewin’s Equation as one of its foundations. Situational prevention also draws 
from three approaches within criminology: Routine Activity Theory, Crime Pattern 
Theory, and the Rational Choice Perspective.  
These three theories are often referred to collectively and individually as 
opportunity theories. Each of the theories is unique, but they all share three 
common assumptions. The first assumption is that crime, and in this case 
insurgent activity, is a result of an interaction between disposition and situation. 
The second and third commonalties are that all three theories seek to explain 
criminal acts, not criminals, and stress the importance of situational opportunities. 
A. ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY 
Criminologists Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson developed routine 
activity theory. This theory states that for a crime to occur, three things must 
come together at the same time and place: a likely offender, a suitable target, 
and the absence of a capable guardian to prevent the crime. Routine activity 
theory always assumes a likely offender exists, and focuses on targets, 
guardianship, and place.7  
                                            
6 Ronald V. Clarke, "Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Scope," 
Crime and Justice 4 (1983): 1. 
7 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 5. 
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Since all three elements must be present for a crime to occur, if one 
element can be controlled, it is possible to prevent or reduce crime. This is often 
modeled as the “Basic Crime Triangle,” but can also be viewed as a “Basic 
Attack Triangle” as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Routine Activity Theory and the Basic Crime and Attack Triangles8 
The guardian is not always a member of a security force, but could be 
anyone whose presence or proximity can deter a crime from happening. A target 
can be a person, place, or an object whose location in time and space puts it at 
more or less risk of criminal attack.9  
Routine activity theory considers targets from the criminal’s point of view. 
Evaluating targets from an insurgent’s point of view is important because 
insurgents, like criminals, are only interested in targets they value. This provides 
                                            
8 “Center for Problem Oriented Policing about CPOP” 
http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=triangle. 
9 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 5. 
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some explanation as to why every potential criminal opportunity is not exploited, 
and why every potential insurgent target is not attacked. 
Felson and Clarke state, “although the routine activity theory begins with 
the basic elements of crime and activity patterns, it ends up emphasizing 
changes in technology and organization on a societal scale.”10 
A societal scale example is the increased use of global communications 
technology by everyday people. This technology is exploited to increase the 
political value of insurgent violence and acts of terrorism, and allows the 
movement of information and money across regional and international 
boundaries. These structural changes in the situational opportunities for 
insurgency and terrorism have societal implications.11 
B. CRIME PATTERN THEORY 
Environmental criminologists Patricia and Paul Brantingham developed 
crime pattern theory, which was published in the book, Environmental 
Criminology in 1981. Crime pattern theory seeks to discover how offenders look 
for and find criminal opportunities in the course of their everyday lives. Since 
insurgent violence is mechanically and operationally the same as ordinary crime, 
crime pattern theory can be used to understand how insurgents identify and 
select targets while going about their activities of daily living.  
Crime pattern theory argues that opportunities for insurgent violence do 
not always occur randomly; insurgents often search for and create these 
opportunities. Crime pattern theory also provides insight into how an insurgent 
evaluates these opportunities and chooses to act upon them.  
Crime pattern theory contains three main elements: nodes, paths, and 
edges. Nodes are the places that a person goes to, such as home, work, and 
                                            




places of recreation. The space around these nodes is considered activity space, 
which is a sub component of a person’s overall awareness space. In activity 
space, people do the things that they do, live, work, socialize, commit crime, or 
engage in insurgent activities.  
Paths are the routes that people take to and from these nodes. Offenders 
and insurgents look for opportunities and targets around their activity nodes and 
along the paths between them.  
Edges refer to the boundaries of the areas where an insurgent lives and 
works. Certain types of attacks are more likely to occur at the edges, such as 
sectarian violence between ethnic groups. More violent events occur along the 
edges because people from different activity spaces come together at the edges. 
Clarke and Felson state that the edges become important because a distinction 
exists between insiders and outsiders. Insiders more often attack within their 
activity spaces, while outsiders find it safer to attack at the edges and then 
retreat into their own areas.12 
Brantingham and Brantingham would argue that target selection is largely 
dependent on routine pathways used by insurgents to move between their 
normal, daily activity nodes; attacks are most likely to occur where the 
awareness space of the insurgent transects with suitable targets.13 
Crime pattern theory is also modeled with a triangle. Figure 2 shows how 
an insurgent goes from his residence to work to recreation. Around these nodes 
of activity, and along the paths and edges, he looks for situational opportunities 
to conduct attacks. Crime pattern theory posits that insurgents may find these 
opportunities a bit distant from their paths, but they prefer to conduct operations 
in the areas that they know because the effort and risk required to commit an 
attack increases the further an insurgent moves outside of his activity space. The 
                                            
12 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 6. 
13 Pat Brantingham and Paul Brantingham, "Crime Pattern Theory,"  
http://www.ceamos.cl/ceamos/images/stories/actividadesyeventos/pattern_theory1.pdf. 
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diagram also shows a buffer zone around the insurgent’s residence. Little 
insurgent activity occurs within the buffer zone because of the risk of being 
identified and renounced to the authorities. There are five target areas within the 
diagram. Attacks are more likely to take place in target areas 1, 2 and 3 because 
they transect the insurgent’s activity space. Target areas 4 and 5 are less likely 
to be attacked because they do not intersect with the insurgent’s activity space. 
The insurgent may, in fact, be unaware of target areas 4 and 5 if they are also 
located outside of his awareness space. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Brantingham Crime Pattern Theory14 
Crime pattern theory also provides insight on how an insurgent evaluates 
opportunities and chooses to act upon them. The following is an adaptation of 
some of the principles of crime pattern theory taken from the Institute of 
                                            
14 Adapted from Kim Rossmo, Geographic Profiling (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2000). 
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Canadian Urban Research Studies (ICURS). As insurgents move through a 
series of activities, they make decisions. When these activities, such as planting 
improvised explosive devices (IED), are repeated frequently, the decision 
process becomes routine. This routine creates an abstract guiding template. For 
decisions to commit a crime, this is called a crime template. For decisions to 
commit insurgent attacks, this can be called an attack template, or in the 
example of emplacing IEDs, an IED attack template.15  
Individual insurgents or networks of insurgents conduct attacks when a 
triggering event occurs and a process by which they can locate a target or a 
victim that fits within an attack template. Insurgents continually revise their attack 
templates based upon experience rather than assuming them to be constant over 
time, and this revision alters future actions. This is also called scripting, and one 
of the goals of the counterinsurgent should be to rewrite the insurgent’s script, by 
introducing failure into their operations.  
The following is an example of how this process can be applied to forming 
an IED attack template. An insurgent observes a lightly-defended convoy of 
military vehicles traveling down a pre-identified section of roadway. This acts as 
a triggering event that fits his IED attack template, and the insurgent attempts to 
attack the convoy with an IED. If the attack is successful, the template is 
reinforced. If the attack fails, or if an insurgent is captured or killed, the template 
must be revised. During this period of revision, subsequent attacks may be 
prevented or delayed until the template can be re-written; often resulting in a net 
decrease of attacks over time. Figure 3 shows this insurgent activity templating 
process.  
                                            




Figure 3.   Insurgent Activity Templating Process16 
The rational choice perspective focuses on the insurgent’s individual 
decision-making process. Its main assumption is that insurgent activity is 
purposeful behavior, and that it is designed to benefit the insurgent. The rational 
choice perspective also attempts to see the act from the insurgent’s point of view. 
Clarke describes the rational choice perspective as seeking to “understand how 
offenders make crime choices, when driven by a particular motive within a 
specific setting, which offers the opportunities to satisfy that motive.”17 The 
rational choice perspective assumes the insurgent thinks before acting, taking 
into account some benefits and costs in committing an attack.  
Although insurgents make rational decisions, their rationality is bounded 
by risk, uncertainty, and the operational constraints that they face. Clarke 
                                            
16 Adapted from Brantingham and Brantingham, Crime Pattern Theory, 
http://www.ceamos.cl/ceamos/images/stories/actividadesyeventos/pattern_theory1.pdf.  
17 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 7. 
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theorizes that the “offender’s calculus is mostly based on that which is most 
evident and immediate, while neglecting the more remote costs and benefits of 
crime or its avoidance.”18 
Specificity is also an important aspect of the rational choice perspective. 
To understand an insurgent’s choices, it is necessary to analyze each specific 
type of attack. The reason for this specificity is that each type of attack has 
different objectives and is influenced by very different situational factors. For 
example, there are several different types of bombing attacks, including IEDs, car 
bombings, and suicide bombings.  
This is not to say that insurgents who conduct one type of bombing would 
never conduct another; it simply states that conducting a suicide bombing attack 
is quite different from planting an IED. Each type of attack is conducted against 
entirely different targets, with different types of bombs, and different objectives. 
Insurgents have to make different choices when conducting different types of 
attacks, and therefore, each type of attack must be analyzed specifically.19 
Specificity makes modus operandi a primary consideration within the rational 
choice perspective.  
This concludes the overview of the three main theories informing 
situational prevention, which can be categorized by the level of explanation they 
address. Routine activity theory examines insurgent behavior from the societal 
level. Crime pattern theory addresses the meso or operational level, and the 
rational choice perspective addresses the individual. Each theory treats 
situational opportunities as a cause of insurgent behavior, and focuses on what 
an insurgent actually does while engaging in these activities. Clarke and Felson 
argue that, together, these three theories indicate that society and the local 
community can change insurgent opportunities, while the individual insurgent 
makes decisions in response to these changes. Clarke and Felson further state, 
                                            
18 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 14. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
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“altering the volume of crime opportunities at any level will produce a change in 
criminal outcomes.”20 Therefore, altering the volume of insurgent opportunities at 
any level also produces a change in the outcomes of insurgent activities; in 
particular, violence and crime. 
C. THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF INSURGENCY 
In their book, Outsmarting the Terrorists, Clarke and Newman have 
identified a basic opportunity structure required for crime to occur, and have 
theorized that terrorism and insurgency require the same opportunity structure. 
The opportunity structure of terrorism and insurgency consists of targets, tools, 
weapons, and facilitating conditions.21 
Clarke and Newman call these the “four pillars of terrorist opportunity,” 
and state they are a “result of technology, the physical environment of society 
and the systems and services that help it to function.”22 The opportunity structure 
can be analyzed as described below. 
1. Targets 
Clarke and Newman identify eight characteristics of targets that make 
them attractive to terrorists and insurgents, and express them through the 
acronym EVIL DONE.23 EVIL DONE is a tool that assists in identifying and 
prioritizing potential targets through the eyes of an insurgent.24  
 
                                            
20 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 7. 
21 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 9. 
22 Ibid., 9. 
23 G. R. Newman, "Reducing Terrorist Opportunities: A Framework for Foreign Policy," Crime 
Prevention Studies 25 (2009): 33–60. 
24 R. Boba, "Evil Done," Crime Prevention Studies 25 (2009): 71–92. Boba scales the criteria 
to develop a methodology to score and rank targets consistently across target types and between 
different analysts. 
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Exposed: Targets that are highly visibility and attract attention, such 
as the Twin Towers in New York City. 
Vital: Targets that provide critical necessities for the daily 
functioning of society, such as transportation systems, utilities, and 
communication systems. 
Iconic: Of symbolic value, such as the Pentagon or religious 
shrines. 
Legitimate: An acceptable target in the eyes of the enemy’s public. 
Destructible: Any target that can successfully be destroyed or 
disabled. 
Occupied: To inflict as many casualties as possible. 
Near: Close to the insurgent’s base of operations or those easily 
accessible by mechanized transportation, making them close in 
time. 
Easy: Targets that are accessible with minimal security, and are 
within the insurgent’s operational capacity to attack.25  
2. Tools 
Newman defines the tools of insurgency as “products that are used in the 
course of an attack.”26 Motor vehicles, mobile phones, false identity documents, 
and information about the target are almost always used by insurgents during the 
course of an attack. Ordinary criminals also seek out and use many of these 
same tools. The tools of insurgency can be controlled in generally three ways: 1) 
modify the products so that they cannot be used for criminal purposes, 2) make 
the products more difficult to obtain illegally, and 3) track the use of the 
products.27 
                                            
25 Newman, “Reducing Terrorist Opportunities: A Framework for Foreign Policy,” 33–60. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 117. 
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3. Weapons 
Nine characteristics make weapons attractive to insurgents, and are 
expressed through the acronym MURDEROUS.28 
Multi-purpose: Weapons that can be used against different types of 
targets. 
Undetectable: Weapons, such as plastic explosives, that can pass 
through security checkpoints. 
Removable: Easily transported. 
Destructive: Explosives are more destructive than small arms. A 
fully automatic weapon is more destructive than a handgun. 
Enjoyable: Terrorists and insurgents, like criminals, and soldiers, 
become attached to their weapons. 
Reliable: Dependability is an important factor in mission success.  
Obtainable: The ability of an insurgent to acquire the weapon by 
whatever means. 
Uncomplicated: Weapons cannot be more sophisticated than the 
insurgent’s ability to use them.  
Safe: Explosives are less safe for an insurgent than firearms.29 
4. Facilitating Conditions 
Clarke describes facilitating conditions as the “social and physical 
arrangements of society that make specific acts of terrorism possible.”30 
Facilitating conditions make it ESEER for insurgents to conduct their operations, 
and are expressed by the same acronym. 
                                            
28 Newman, “Reducing Terrorist Opportunities: A Framework for Foreign Policy,” 33–60. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 117. 
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Easy: Examples include cash as a means of exchange, and 
governmental corruption. 
Safe: Governments’ inability to authenticate an individual’s 
identification. 
Excusable: Kinsmen injured or killed as a result of collateral 
damage. 
Enticing: Cultural and religious endorsement of heroic acts of 
violence. 
Rewarding: Some insurgents are paid for their services. Other 
insurgents may seek status, absolution, or the promise of sex in the 
afterlife.31 
Opportunity structures operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of an insurgency, but it is at the tactical level where the opportunity 
structure of an insurgency is most profound. Newman argues that the first step to 
understanding the opportunity structure of an insurgency is to identify it at the 
tactical level. Tactical level opportunity structures are identified, “by focusing on 
the specific economic, physical, cultural, and social elements within the 
environment, on the ground where the insurgents operate.”32 By identifying the 
targets, tools, weapon, and facilitating conditions at the tactical level, it is 
possible to trace the links between what are essentially local insurgent activities, 
and the operational and strategic conditions that both enhance and constrain 
them.33 
D. THE PRINCIPLES OF SITUATIONAL PREVENTION 
Situational crime prevention (SCP) theory introduces 25 opportunity-
reducing techniques. According to Clarke and Newman, the principal value of 
these techniques is to increase the repertoire of possible interventions used to 
                                            




reduce specific forms of insurgent violence and crime. The 25 techniques are 
designed around five main principles that research has shown to affect the 
decision-making process of criminal offenders. These five categories are also the 
core principles of SCP, increasing effort, increasing risk, reducing rewards, 
reducing provocations, and removing excuses.34 Charts articulating the principles 
with their corresponding techniques and suggested COIN related interventions 
are shown in subsequent pages. 
The first two principles of increasing effort and risk are cost variables. Five 
techniques are designed to increase the perceived level of effort to commit an 
attack, and are also designed to increase the perceived risk in conducting an 
attack. 
The third principle of reducing anticipated rewards is a benefit variable. 
The five techniques within this category are intended to reduce the insurgent’s 
anticipated rewards. 
The last two principles of removing excuses and reducing provocations 
can be considered supplemental variables. Each of these categories also has a 
set of five techniques designed to remove excuses (justification, rationalization) 
for violence, and immediate provocations or temptations for committing an attack. 
The theory argues that situational changes should be made that seek to 
increase the perceived amount of effort and risk, decrease anticipated rewards, 
and remove excuses and provocations. The theory advocates for a balance 
between increasing perceived costs and decreasing perceived benefits. An 
imbalance either results in an attack being conducted, or an over allocation of 
security resources. Specifically, when an imbalance indicates benefits exceed 
costs, an insurgent makes the rational choice to commit the attack. When the 
imbalance increases perceived costs beyond what is needed to counterbalance 
anticipated rewards, an attack is deterred, but this may result in an over 
allocation of security resources.  
                                            
34 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 188–189. 
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Adapting situational crime prevention theory to counterinsurgency 
operations then leads to the following propositions:  
• Proposition 1. Increasing the effort required to commit specific 
insurgent activities leads to a reduction in those activities.  
• Proposition 2. Increasing the risk involved in committing specific 
insurgent activities leads to a reduction in those activities.  
• Proposition 3. Reducing the anticipated reward of engaging in 
specific insurgent activities leads to a reduction in those activities. 
• Proposition 4. Removing excuses for engaging in insurgent 
activities leads to a reduction in those activities. 
• Proposition 5. Reducing provocations to commit insurgent 
activities leads to a reduction in those activities. 
These propositions are taken directly from situational crime prevention 
theory and, by extension, the rational choice perspective.  
E. THE 25 TECHNIQUES OF SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 
The first set of five techniques are designed to increase the effort required 
for insurgents to engage their targets, acquire their weapons, use their tools, 
exploit facilitating conditions, and maintain their organization. When operations 
become more difficult, an insurgent system can be forced to expend more effort 
and resources to maintain its operational tempo successfully. Clarke and 
Newman argue, “if we can raise the level of effort high enough for some their 
tasks, we may see them either give up on a particular target or take much longer 
to execute their terrorist mission.”35 Table 1 shows the five effort reducing 




                                            
35 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 189. 





Technique COIN Related 
Intervention 
1. Harden Targets T-Barriers, Shatter 
Proof Glass 
2. Control Access Gating, Fencing, Entry 
phones, Swipe Cards 
3. Screen Exits Tickets needed, Export 
Documents, Property 
tagging 














5. Control Tools  
 & Weapons 
Disable unregistered 
cell phones, RFID/GIS 
tracking of weapons 
Table 1.   Increase Effort 
Increasing the risk of being killed, captured, or mission failure is a cost 
consideration within an insurgent’s individual decision-making process. Even a 
suicide bomber faces risk, the risk of mission failure. Table 2 shows the five risk 










                                            





Technique COIN Related 
Intervention 
1. Extend  
 Guardianship 
Deterrence Patrolling , 
Take Routine 
Precautions 
2. Assist Natural  
 Surveillance 
Lighting, Defensible 




National ID Card, 
Register SIM cards in 
Cell Phones, 
Biometrics 












5. Strengthen  
 Formal  
 Surveillance 
CCTV, Alarm Systems, 
Security Guards, metal 
detectors 
Table 2.   Increase Risk 
Reducing the anticipated rewards of insurgent and terrorist activity is 
becoming recognized as an effective strategy, not only in reducing that activity, 
but also in hampering insurgent recruitment efforts. Marc Sageman, in his book, 
Leaderless Jihad, says it is important to take the “glory” out of engaging in these 
activities, and that glory is a type of reward.38 The five reward reducing 
techniques not only help prevent attacks, but mitigate the subsequent damage 










                                            





Technique COIN Related 
Intervention 
1. Conceal Targets Low Profile Vehicles, Avoid 
Identifying Signage & 
Markings 
2. Remove Targets Limit Unnecessary Convoys, 
Removable electronics in 
Vehicles 
3. Identify  
 Property 
Stamp Small Arms, GPS 
Tagging, Property Markings, 
Vehicles ID Numbers (VIN) 










5. Deny Benefits Use of publicity to highlight 
hypocrisy of insurgent acts, 
Design guidelines to reduce 
casualties 
Table 3.   Reduce Rewards39 
Reducing provocations and removing excuses are the final two principles 
of situational prevention, and each principle offers five additional techniques that 










                                            





Technique COIN Related  
Intervention 
1. Reduce  
 Frustrations 
 and Stress 
Treat Public Courteously, 
Expanded Seating, Efficient 
Queuing (Line Management) 
2. Avoid Disputes Separate Rival Factions, 
Fight Enemies Strategy not 
his Forces 
3. Reduce  
 Emotional  
 Arousal  
Avoid Provocative 
Announcements, Clear ROE  
4. Neutralize Peer  
 Pressure 












5. Discourage  
 Imitation  
Rapid clean up of Attack 
Scenes, Censor Details of 
Modus Operandi 




Technique COIN Related 
Intervention 
1. Set Rules Clear ROE, Clear rules for 
public demonstrations, 
Clear Regulations, Codes of 
Conduct 
2. Post  
 Instructions 
No Parking, No Entry , No 
Cell Phones 
3. Alert Conscious Require ID & Signature, 
Visible Electronic 
Surveillance  
4. Assist  
 Compliance 
Barriers, Public Restrooms, 









5. Control Drugs 
 and Alcohol  
Alcohol Free Events, public 
Shaming 
Table 5.   Remove Excuses41 
                                            
40 Adapted from Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorist, 190–194. 
41 Ibid. 
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The value of the 25 techniques of situational prevention is that they offer a 
practical means to apply the principles of opportunity theory to the reality of 
counterinsurgency operations. Use of the 25 techniques expands the repertoire 
of interventions, and enables a security force to intervene in the causal chain 
events to prevent or reduce the occurrence of insurgent violence and crime.  
The 25 techniques also provide a way of systematizing an insurgency 
reducing strategy. Situational prevention must be a continual process to be an 
effective part of counter insurgency operations. Criminals, terrorists, and 
insurgents are adaptive. They make rational decisions to exploit new 
opportunities whenever they become available, which is one of the limits of 
situational prevention; there is never a final solution.42  
F. CONCLUSION 
Insurgent behavior, like all behavior, is a function between the person and 
the environment. As such, insurgent activities depend on the conjunction 
between the insurgents’ motivation (of whatever nature and whatever source) 
and the situational opportunities presented to them within their environment 
(whether defined in terms of risks, efforts or rewards of their acts).43 Society and 
the local community can change insurgent opportunities, while the individual 
insurgent makes decisions in response to these changes.  
The 25 techniques of situational prevention provide a means to reduce the 
volume of insurgent opportunities, and affect insurgent decisions by altering their 
perceptions of risk and anticipated rewards. Altering the volume of insurgent 
opportunities at any level also produces a change in the outcomes of insurgent 
activities; in particular, violence and crime. 
                                            
42 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
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III. CASE STUDIES: SITUATIONAL PREVENTION IN COIN 
Situational prevention has not been used explicitly as a framework for 
reducing insurgent violence in counterinsurgency operations. However, the 
principles and techniques of situational prevention are often implemented 
intuitively in reducing specific types of terrorist or insurgent attacks. 
This chapter consists of three case studies evaluating the effectiveness of 
situational prevention techniques when used to reduce violence. The first case 
examined is Operation Cul-de-Sac (OCDS), which was an experiment conducted 
against gang violence in the City of Los Angeles, California. The second case is 
that of Peace Walls and the security cordon in Belfast Northern Ireland, 
commonly referred to as the Ring of Steel, and the third case reviews the effects 
of the Israeli Security Fence on suicide bombings in Israel. 
These cases were selected for two reasons. First, the interventions that 
were taken clearly involved changing the physical environment for the purpose of 
reducing paramilitary style attacks. Secondly, similar techniques were used in 
each of these cases to increase effort and risk, which allowed for a more valid 
cross comparison.  
Other measures were taken in conjunction with situational prevention in 
these cases, and some displacement of violence and some adaptation of tactics 
by different groups occurred. Nevertheless, opportunity reduction appears to 
have reduced the overall level of violence.  
A. OPERATION CUL–DE–SAC  
Operation Cul-de-Sac (OCDS) was an experiment to ascertain if 
situational prevention techniques could be used to “design” out violent gang 
crime. This experiment was conducted for two years, and evaluated by the U.S. 
Justice Department’s National Institute for Justice (NIJ). NIJ’s evaluation 
concluded that OCDS appeared to have significantly reduced violent crime, 
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including homicide. Another significant finding by NIJ was that the reduction of 
violent crime in the test area did not increase crime in the surrounding areas.44  
In 1989, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) conducted an 
analysis of a ten-block area. This area had the highest rate of gang-related drive-
by shootings, homicides, and assaults. The LAPD analysis concluded that the 
majority of drive-by shootings occurred along the boundaries of neighborhoods 
connected with major through streets.45  
This observation by the LAPD about where most of the drive-by shootings 
were occurring is consistent with the Brantinghams’s crime pattern theory. The 
boundaries of neighborhoods are the edges between different groups of people’s 
activity spaces, and the major thoroughfares were the paths that gang members 
traveled that transected these target areas. These paths provided ample and 
easy opportunity in terms of targets and facilitating conditions to conduct drive-by 
shootings, homicides, and assaults.  
Operating on Ronald Clarke’s situational prevention theory, the LAPD 
assumed that these violent crimes were not random events. The LAPD surmised 
that gang members made rational decisions about whether to commit specific 
acts of criminal violence, and whether they should commit those acts in specific 
neighborhood settings or situations. There was ample empirical evidence to 
support this theory as it related to other crimes, but OCDS was one of the first 
attempts to apply situational prevention to reduce gang violence.46  
At the time OCDS was conducted, many criminologists and law 
enforcement officials doubted that situational prevention would be effective in 
reducing gang violence. The objections raised are very similar to the objections 
now being offered in reference to its application in counterinsurgency operations. 
                                            
44 James R. Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime: Key Findings and 
Implications for Law Enforcement Agencies; A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-
Sac (Rockville, MD: National Criminal Reference Service, 1996), 2–4. 
45 Ibid., 1. 
46 Ibid., 3. 
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The two objections most often raised were that gang crime is more motivated 
and organized than other crime, and that preventing these activities in one area 
would simply displace them to another area. In spite of these objections, the 
experiment was conducted in the following manner. 
The LAPD used three principles and at least five techniques of situational 
prevention to reduce the opportunities for these specific types of paramilitary 
style gang violence. The LAPD applied the principles of increasing effort and risk, 
and also reduced rewards through the following techniques: 1) controlling 
access, 2) deflecting offenders, 3) extending guardianship, 4) assisting natural 
surveillance, and 5) concealing targets.  
The intervention used to implement these principles and techniques was 
to place simple traffic barriers that blocked motor vehicle access to the areas in 
which the violence was taking place. The LAPD initially placed cement freeway 
dividers at the end of streets intersecting with the major thoroughfares. These 
barriers were put in place within the time span of one week. The cement barriers 
were eventually replaced with locked steel gates that could be opened to permit 
access to emergency vehicles. The barriers generally allowed one unrestricted 
entry and exit point into the neighborhoods, which essentially created cul-de-
sacs.47 
Redesigning the traffic flow into this high crime area was a means of 
implementing several of the principles and techniques of situational crime 
prevention. Redirecting traffic obviously controls access to and deflects offenders 
away from the target area. Cul-de-sacs also assist in natural surveillance and 
conceal targets by forcing a driver to decrease vehicle speed and turn around to 
exit the street; thus, making it easier for residents, the natural guardians of their 
neighborhoods, to identify suspicious drivers and vehicles. Targets are partially 
concealed because an offender must make a purposeful effort to enter the area;  
 
                                            
47 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime: Key Findings and Implications for 
Law Enforcement Agencies; A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-Sac, 2. 
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he does not spot a target of opportunity by merely passing by. This increases the 
effort and risk involved to a perpetrator when entering into these areas and 
committing violent crimes.  
The technique of extending guardianship is implemented in several ways 
by creating cul-de-sacs. Cul-de-sacs reduce through traffic, which allows 
residents to learn who belongs in their neighborhood and who does not. Clarke 
explains how street closures can also keep residents from committing crimes in 
their own neighborhoods because offenders cannot as easily blame outsiders to 
deflect suspicion from themselves. Clarke also indicates that attackers risk 
retaliation from their would-be victims when their escape routes are blocked, and 
this also assists in reducing drive-by shootings.48 
Cul-de-sacing streets also weakened the opportunity structure required to 
commit drive-by shootings, homicides, and assaults. The opportunity structure of 
crime and insurgency consists of targets, tools, weapons, and facilitating 
conditions. Motor vehicles are tools almost always used by criminals and 
insurgents in conducting operations. Many violent crimes and insurgent attacks, 
such as drive by shootings, cannot be conducted without the use of motor 
vehicles. Cul-de-sacs restrict the use of motor vehicles, which constrains their 
effective use as a tool for crime and insurgency. The importance of traffic 
patterning and traffic control within urban areas cannot be understated in 
reducing criminal and insurgent violence.  
OCDS further reduced the opportunity structure of violent crime by making 
it more difficult to access targets, and reducing facilitating conditions that made 
the violence less easy, less safe, less enticing, less excusable, and less 
rewarding.49 Facilitating conditions are the social and physical arrangements of  
 
                                            
48 R. V. G. Clarke and United States, Dept. of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, "Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime should You Go Down this Road?" U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 6. 
49 ESEER is the acronym that describes the societal and environmental conditions that 
enhance insurgent opportunity. 
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society that make specific criminal acts possible. There are five categories of 
facilitating conditions and they are described by the acronym (E, S, E, E, R), and 
OCDS reduced these conditions.  
The number of homicides and street assaults declined significantly in both 
years of OCDS, and then increased after the program ended according to James 
Lasley, who concluded there was no displacement of violent crime to the 
surrounding areas.50 The contiguous areas outside of the OCDS test area also 
benefited from a decrease in violent crime, which is known as “diffusion” within 
situational criminology. Lasley theorizes this diffusion may have occurred 
because the areas of possible displacement may be the turf of other rival gangs, 
and that the perpetrators would not enter into that territory. 
Crime pattern theory and the rational choice perspective also support the 
diffusion. The crimes were occurring on the edges of neighborhoods by outsiders 
who could then retreat into their own activity spaces. As the traffic barriers 
redirected the paths taken by gang members away from the OCDS area, they did 
not necessarily cause them to transect with other potential target areas, but 
deflected them onto the major thoroughfares.  
As explained in the previous chapter, offenders may find targets a bit 
distant from their paths, but they prefer to stay within their own activity space 
because effort and risk tends to increase the farther a person strays from their 
activity space. This is a factor in the offender’s rational decision-making process. 
In 1980, the year before OCDS was conducted, there were seven 
homicides, 38 drive-by shootings, and 190 aggravated street assaults committed 
within the ten-block test area. In the two years OCDS was conducted, only one 
homicide occurred within the test area. Aggravated assaults also decreased in 
the OCDS area from 176 to 163 in 1990 and from 163 to 138 in 1991. See 
                                            
50 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime: Key Findings and Implications for 
Law Enforcement Agencies; A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-Sac, 1. 
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Figures 4 and 551, which are statistically significant results that cannot be 
explained by random fluctuations in crime rates.52  
 
 
Figure 4.   Homicides Fell during Operation Cul-de-Sac53 
                                            
51 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime ,1996.  
52 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime: Key Findings and Implications for 
Law Enforcement Agencies; A Program Evaluation of LAPD's Operation Cul-De-Sac, 2–3. All 
crime data were reported by year, as well as quarterly. Since the sample sizes were very small, 
tests were conducted to determine their statistical significance,* with the test for significance set 
at p< .05. (For findings significant at this level, the chances are less than 5 in 100 that the result 
has occurred randomly.) The statistical tests used both parametric (t-test for correlated samples) 
and nonparametric methods (the Wilcoxson Matched-Pairs Test). See S. Siegel, Nonparametric 
Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956). 
53 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime 1996, 4–5.  
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Figure 5.   Assaults Fell during Operation Cul-de-Sac54 
Lasley also observed that gang members did not adjust their modus 
operandi to adapt to the presence of the traffic barriers. That is to say, gang 
members did not seek to find alternative ways to sustain their operational 
capacity for violence. A notable difference exists between OCDS and the two 
remaining test cases examined in this chapter. Ideologically motivated 
perpetrators seem to make a more concerted effort to overcome obstacles to 
sustain their operational capacity. Gang members and accidental guerrillas 
appear to be more apt merely to exploit available opportunities. However, as 
demonstrated in the remaining case studies, even the most dedicated insurgents 
have difficulty maintaining their operational capacity when situational 
opportunities are reduced.  
OCDS was one of the first formally conducted experiments to use 
situational prevention in reducing semi-organized gang violence in the United 
States, and was evaluated by the USDOJ’s National Institute of Justice. The 
                                            
54 Lasley, Using Traffic Barriers to "Design Out" Crime 1996, 4–5. 
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National Institute of Justice concluded that OCDS appeared to reduce violent 
crime significantly without displacing the violence into adjoining areas. 
B. THE RING OF STEEL AND THE PEACE LINES OF BELFAST 
This case study analyzes the Ring of Steel and the Peace Lines of Belfast. 
This particular case study is predicated more on anecdotal evidence and 
testimonials than on scientifically quantifiable evidence because the interventions 
were geographically focused, while the majority of the statistical data is regional. 
Many other countermeasures were also taken in conjunction with these 
situational approaches. To paraphrase the words of Nick Ross, few randomized 
double-blind trials exist when it comes to counterinsurgency operations.55 
Ross also writes that even though he could not recall the term “situational 
crime prevention” being applied to British policy in Northern Ireland, it was 
fundamental to the British’s success.56 Ross cites the Peace Walls and the “Ring 
of Steel” placed around Belfast’s shopping center as being rarely celebrated, but 
highly successful in preventing attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
Similar situational preventive measures were also taken in London and 
Manchester after the IRA conducted bombing attacks in these cities. These 
preventive measures included re-patterning traffic, search points, and closed 
circuit television cameras. All of these types of interventions increased the effort 
and risk involved in conducting attacks in those cities.  
Ross observes that even though these preventive measures may have 
been applied piecemeal, and without an overarching strategy, they were highly 
effective. Violence was often prevented altogether, and when violence did occur, 
it generally forced the shift to lesser value targets, and more importantly, less 
“spectacular” targets. When attacks could not be prevented, damage was 
                                            
55 N. Ross, "How to Lose the War on Terror: Lessons of a 30 Year War in Northern Ireland," 
Crime Prevention Studies 25 (2009): 229–244. 
56 Ibid. 
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limited.57 Channeling attacks to lesser value targets and limiting the damage of 
those attacks reduces the rewards of the act, and theoretically, figures into an 
insurgent’s rational decision-making process. 
The “troubles” in Northern Ireland between Catholic Republicans, Britain, 
and Protestant Loyalists began in 1968. Bombings and shootings became 
routine. Stephen Brown writes that for the citizens of Belfast, the campaign of 
terror commenced in July 1970, when, without warning, a large bomb destroyed 
a bank in the city’s business district and injured 33 people.58 
This represented a change in tactics by the IRA as the city center’s 
business district had not been previously targeted. Shootings and bombings 
increased in 1972, and in response, authorities began to implement situational 
preventive measures.59  
Beginning in March of 1972, two control zones were established in the city 
center, an inner zone and an outer zone. These zones were created to make it 
more difficult to conduct car bombings. The inner zone prohibited the parking of 
motor vehicles at any time. The outer zone offered relaxed parking restrictions at 
night. However, the IRA adapted by employing proxy bombs, whereby people 
were coerced to drive car bombs into British military targets, and incendiaries.60 
The city then established a security segment or cordon around the core of the 
city’s business district in mid-July 1972. 
The security segment consisted of barbwire barriers that blocked access 
to the city center from side streets. Checkpoints were established at the main 
entrances where the British Army searched all pedestrians and delivery vehicles 
before entry. These measures applied the principles of increasing effort and risk, 
                                            
57 Ross, "How to Lose the War on Terror: Lessons of a 30 Year War in Northern Ireland," 
229–244. 
58 Ralf Brand, "The Power of Meaning: Artifacts and Social Practices in a Contested City," 
EASST Conference 2006 (2006), www2.unil.ch/easst2006/Papers/B/Brand.pdf, 1. 
59 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 171. 
60 Brand, “The Power of Meaning: Artifacts and Social Practices in a Contested City,” 3. 
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and also reduced terrorist rewards by preventing successful bombing attacks 
within the city’s business district. The security segment is an intervention based 
upon the situational prevention techniques of controlling access and 
strengthening formal surveillance.  
Three days after the cordon was established, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) detonated 22 bombs within 75 minutes of each other in 
Belfast. These bombings occurred on July 21, 1972 and became known as 
Bloody Friday. Jon Coafee, on July 22, quotes the Belfast Telegraph, “the city 
has not experienced such a day of death and destruction since the German blitz 
of 1941 [however]…it was significant that all yesterday’s explosions occurred 
outside the new restricted traffic zones.”61 Coafee further states, “since its 
inception no car bomb has exploded inside the Belfast Ring of Steel (the security 
segment) and it can therefore, according to security forces, be judged 
successful.62 Coafee also stresses that Bloody Friday appeared to support the 
theory that preventing attacks in one location would merely displace them to 
another location. However, this displacement did not continue.  
By 1974, the crude system of barbwire barriers was replaced by steel 
gates, which became known as the “Ring of Steel.” By 1976, there were only two 
entry points into the city center with all other avenues being opened for exit only. 
The city center was divided into secure gated segments with checkpoints and 
searches conducted before entry. The City of Belfast employed a Civilian Search 
Unit consisting of male and female inspectors to conduct the searches. Figure 6 
depicts the Ring of Steel on a city map and was taken from Stephen Brown’s 
article, Central Belfast’s Security Segment: An Urban Phenomenon.  
 
                                            
61 Jon Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk, and the City: The Making of a Contemporary Urban 
Landscape (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 21. 
62 Ibid., 26–27. 
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Figure 6.   Ring of Steel on a City Map63 
Although the area protected by the security segment may appear to be 
geographically small, it represents the heart of Belfast’s business district, and 
Belfast is the capital of Northern Ireland.  
Part of the IRA’s strategy was to target Northern Ireland economically. 
Between 1970 and 1975, there were over 1,800 explosions and over 40 percent 
of these had targeted commercial properties. Many shops, offices, and nightclubs 
                                            
63 Stephen Brown, "Central Belfast's Security Segment: An Urban Phenomenon," Area 17, 
no. 1 (1985): 2. 
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were destroyed, and some of these businesses were targeted more than several 
times. During the same time period, over 300 centrally located businesses had 
been destroyed, which amounted to a loss of over 25 percent of the retail floor 
space in the city. The IRA was successfully strangling the city economically, and 
it had to be stopped if Britain was going to win the peace.64 
Other preventive measures were also taken, but the effectiveness of the 
Ring of Steel can be inferred by the fact that no car bomb has exploded inside 
the Ring of Steel since its implementation, including the bombing attacks that 
occurred on Bloody Friday. Although other factors would have also contributed, 
the success of the Ring of Steel was also supported by the significant decrease 
in the number of bombings in the city from 62 in 1974, to three in 1984.65  
Besides the Ring of Steel, the government also erected “Peace Walls” to 
separate the interfaces between Protestant and Catholic communities in 
Northern Ireland. These barriers were erected for the purpose reducing sectarian 
violence. The Peace Walls work on the principles of increasing effort and risk, but 
it can also be argued that they remove immediate provocations and temptations 
to just drive into another’s neighborhood and commit sectarian violence.  
The Peace Walls of Northern Ireland were erected not only in Belfast, but 
also in Derry, and other cities. The walls were originally designed to be 
temporary structures for reducing sectarian violence between Catholic and 
Protestant communities. However, because of their effectiveness, they still stand 
today.  
In fact, 53 Peace Walls are maintained in Northern Ireland today, and 42 
of these are located in Belfast. The first wall, wall number one, was erected in 
1969 following riots and house burnings. The last wall was built in 2009 on the 
grounds of an integrated primary school following a period of local tension.66 
                                            
64 Brown, "Central Belfast's Security Segment: An Urban Phenomenon," 3. 
65 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 171. 
66 "BBC NEWS |UK| Northern Ireland | the Walls that Don't Come Down," 
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The Peace Walls vary in construction and length. Some walls are 25 feet 
high and constructed of concrete, corrugated iron, and fencing, while some 
consist merely of a white line painted on the ground. Ralf Brand, in an article 
entitled, “The Power of Meaning: Artifacts and Social Practices in a Contested 
City,” describes the Peace Walls: 
Some walls are a few hundred meters in length and others are 
several kilometers long. Some are operated year-round by the 
police while others are controlled by the adjacent communities. In 
some cases, sophisticated local arrangements facilitate the 
continuation of daily life along fortified interfaces. For example, it is 
the nearby chemist who holds a key to the pedestrian gate at 
Duncairn Gardens to ensure the accessibility to medical drugs to 
anyone at any time.67  
Figure 7 shows the location and relative length of the first Peace Wall 
constructed in the early 1970s. 
 
Figure 7.   Peace Walls Belfast68 
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68 "CAIN: Maps: Maps of Ireland and Northern Ireland,” 
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Brand also describes other less spectacular situational preventive 
measures, such as the liberal use of cul-de-sacs to reduce sectarian violence. He 
also states that many of the solutions for reducing violence are “candidates for 
any textbook about Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED).”69 
CPTED is a sub field of situational prevention based on the concept that 
proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction 
in both the incidence and fear of crime, while also improving the quality of life.70 
CPTED is based on four interrelated principles: natural surveillance, 
natural access control, territorial reinforcement, and maintenance. When taken 
into consideration, these principles deter and reduce crime, and in this case, 
sectarian political violence. Brand states that the cul-de-sac design in the Short 
Strand neighborhood deliberately "minimized the exit points in the area, thus 
permitting it to be secured quickly and with minimum resources."71 
It is difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Ring of Steel and the 
Peace Walls conclusively. However, a geospatial analysis of both Ring of Steel 
and the Peace Walls illustrates how these structures can increase the effort and 
risk required to conduct insurgent attacks within the city of Belfast. 
 
                                            
69 Brand, “The Power of Meaning: Artifacts and Social Practices in a Contested City,” 8. 
70 "Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Basic CPTED): Community Security by 
Design—University of Louisville," https://louisville.edu/ncpi/upcoming-seminars/community-
security-by-design.html. 
71 Brand, “The Power of Meaning: Artifacts and Social Practices in a Contested City,” 8. 
 39
 
Figure 8.   Geospatial Analysis of Both Ring of Steel and the Peace Walls72 
This geospatial analysis was conducted by geo-referencing the previously 
shown maps of the Security Segment and the Peace Walls as image overlays to 
the satellite images of Belfast in Google Earth. This provides a depiction of the 
Peace Walls and the Ring of Steel as they were in mid 1970s. The analysis 
shows that the Ring of Steel and the Peace Walls are located in an area less 
than 2.5 miles from north to south and less than 4.5 miles from east to west.  
These structures, combined with formal surveillance, screening, and direct 
action taken by security forces, increase the effort and risk required to conduct 
insurgent operations in Belfast. Although only anecdotally possible to conclude 
that the erection of the Ring of Steel and the Peace Walls resulted in a  
 
 
                                            
72 Author created image in Google Earth by adding Figures 6 and 7 as image overlays to the 
satellite image of Belfast.  This enabled the author to conform the figures to the actual satellite 
images of the terrain.  
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statistically significant reduction in insurgent attacks, the interventions are at least 
perceived to be effective, as evidenced by the fact that the structures are still 
maintained today. 
C. THE ISRAELI SECURITY FENCE 
The final example of situational prevention analyzed is that of the Israeli 
Security Fence, which consists primarily of a network of chain link fences and 
vehicle barrier trenches designed to increase the effort and risk required to 
conduct terrorist attacks against Israel. The fence was constructed with a 
crossing point on average every 1.8 miles to enable the controlled access of 
people and goods, as well as to allow the Israeli security forces to conduct formal 
surveillance and exit screening.73 
 
Figure 9.   Israeli Security Fence74 
                                            




Construction of the fence began in May of 2002 as part of a larger Israeli 
military operation known as Operation Defensive Shield. Operation Defensive 
Shield was initiated after a suicide bomber killed 30 people and wounded 140 
others in the Passover Massacre on March 27, 2002. According to the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, 55 suicide-bombing attacks occurred against Israel in 2002, and 
these resulted in the deaths of 220 people.75  
Only one of these suicide bombings had originated from the Gaza Strip. 
Since 1994, a security fence has operated along the entire land border of the 
Gaza strip, and was reinforced in 2000. The Israelis surmised that the security 
fence had stopped the suicide bomber in Gaza, and then they proceeded to 
construct a similar obstacle as an integral part of Operation Defensive Shield.  
Major General Doron Almog is the former commander of the Israeli 
Defense Force’s (IDF) Southern Command. He commanded the Southern 
Command, which includes the Gaza Strip from 2000–2003. General Almog, in an 
article entitled, “Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank,” states, 
“the experience gained by the IDF's Southern Command in the Gaza Strip is the 
basis for our efforts to implement the new fence in the West Bank.”76 
General Almog writes that as a Gaza Strip Division commander, he was 
involved in building the original security fence in 1994. When he assumed the 
Southern Command in 2000, he found that the Palestinians had dismantled the 
security fence. General Almog states his “first move” as commander was to 
rebuild the fence with the addition of a 1-kilometer buffer zone, and high 
technology observation posts. These observation posts allow an IDF soldier to  
 
 
                                            




76 "Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank—Maj. Gen. (Res.) Doron Almog," 
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-12.htm. 
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observe a 6-kilometer area day and night. These interventions were 
supplemented with new rules of engagement pertaining to anyone who entered 
into this area.77 
General Almog states that during his tenure as commander, there were 
“400 attempts by Palestinians to cross the boundaries of the Gaza Strip, all of 
which failed.” He attributes this success rate to the security fence, actionable 
intelligence, and responsive actions inside the territory.78 
Successful suicide bombings decreased immediately after the first section 
of the new fence in the West Bank was completed. Successful attacks decreased 
from a high of approximately 17 per month in 2002, to an average rate of 
approximately two per month in 2004. Since construction of the fence began, the 
number of attacks has declined by more than 90 percent. The number of Israelis 
killed and wounded has also decreased by more than 70% and 85%, 
respectively, after erection of the fence.79 Figure 10, obtained from the Israeli 
government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shows an immediate drop in successful 
suicide bombings and an immediate increase in intercepted attacks after the 
completion of the first sections of the security fence. 
 
                                            
77 "Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank—Maj. Gen. (Res.) Doron Almog." 
78 Ibid. 




Figure 10.   Suicide Bombings in Israel since Construction of the Security 
Fence80 
The Israeli Defense Ministry states, “the security fence, the buffer zone, 
and even the sections of the fence which have not been completed, limit the 
ability of terrorist organizations to enter Israel, and present operational obstacles, 
making it difficult for them to carry out suicide bombing attacks within Israel.”81 
The following figures illustrate the reduction in successful suicide 
bombings and Israeli casualties by year after the first sections of the security 
fence were completed. Note the initial increase and then the subsequent 
substantial decrease in the number of intercepted attacks, which is an indicator 
that a drop has also occurred in the number of attempted suicide bombings. A 
reduction in the number of attempted attacks is an indicator of a decrease in the 
motivation required to commit these attacks. 
                                            
80 “The Israeli Government’s Official Web site, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 
81 Ibid. 
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This leads to an additional hypothesis that a decrease in situational 
opportunity results in a decline in insurgent activity. A drop in activity results in a 
decrease in insurgent motivation leading to a further reduction in insurgent 
activity. This can be modeled as a virtuous or vicious cycle as it is further 
possible to argue that an increase in situational opportunity also increases the 
activity, and the motivation to engage in the activity. Intercepted attacks appear 
to be a cost variable that affects the insurgent’s rational choice about whether to 





Figure 11.   Number of Suicide Bombings Executed and Prevented by Year, 
2000-2008.82 
                                            
82 “The Israeli Government’s Official Web site, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 
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Figure 12.   Number of Israeli Deaths from Suicide Bombings, by Year, 2000-
2008.83 
The Israeli Security Fence, like the Ring of Steel, and the Peace Walls 
operates on several principles of situational prevention. The fence increases risk 
and effort, and it reduces the anticipated rewards for conducting suicide attacks 
by resulting in insurgent failure. The barrier also implements several techniques 
of situational prevention. The fence controls access, screens exits, assists in 
natural surveillance, and increases formal surveillance.  
The fence also conceals and hardens targets. Approximately 3.8% of the 
security fence is walled. The walled portion of the fence line lies along Highway 
6, and faces areas where Palestinian snipers can target and shoot commuters. 
The wall offsets buildings from the highway, and is approximately 28 feet high. 
This height is calculated to conceal pedestrians and motorists from a sniper’s 
view when atop a roadside building as illustrated in Figure 13.84 These types of 
                                            
83 "The Israeli Government's Official Web site, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." 
84 Ibid. 
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security measures reduce the opportunity structures of specific types of attacks, 
and demonstrates it is not out of the range of possibility to eliminate certain types 
of attacks altogether.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Walled Section Target Concealment85 
Similar to Operation Cul-de-Sac, and the Ring of Steel, the effectiveness 
of the security fence can be inferred from the statistically significant decrease in 
the number of successful suicide bombings immediately after its construction 
began. A geospatial analysis from 2002 to 2008 also shows a correlation 
between the erection of the fence and a decrease in the number of attacks and 
Israeli causalities from suicide bombings.86 
As construction of the security fence began, the number of suicide 
bombing attacks began to decrease, and the number of attacks intercepted by 
Israeli security forces, began to increase. The attacks that did occur were less  
 
                                            
85 "The Israeli Government's Official Web site, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." 
86 Map data adapted from Andrew Menard and Phillip Boyden, Temporal-Spatial Analysis of 
Episodic Palestinian Israeli Violence during the Second Intifada (Naval Postgraduate School: 
Unpublished, 2009). 
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effective as shown by the casualty density maps in Figure 14. These maps depict 







Figure 14.   Casualty Density Maps87 
Analyzing these maps shows a substantial decrease in Israeli casualties 
as each portion of the security fence was being erected. The maps do not reveal 
any substantial displacement pattern of violence in an attempt to overcome the 
obstacles. The statistics from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that after 
an initial increase, the number of intercepted suicide bombing attacks has also 
decreased. This decline in the number of intercepted suicide bombings is also an 
indicator of a drop in the number of attempted suicide bombings. A decrease in 
the number of attempted suicide bombings could be the result of a reduction in 
the anticipated insurgent rewards resulting from the increase in intercepted or 
failed attacks. 
A testimonial from a leader of Islamic Jihad offers additional convincing 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of the security fence. On November 11, 
2006, Islamic Jihad leader Abdallah Ramadan Shalah, said on Al-Manar 
                                            
87 Author created casualty density maps by adding Menard and Boyden’s images as 
overlays in Google Earth and inserting the appropriate statistical data from sources cited in the 
body of this research. 
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television that suicide bombing attacks are the Palestinian people’s “strategic 
choice,” and are meant to “create a balance of force and deterrence” in the 
campaign against a superior enemy.88  
Shalah further stated that his organization had every intention of 
continuing suicide bombing attacks, but that their timing and the possibility of 
implementing them from the West Bank depended on other factors. “For 
example,” he said, “there is the separation fence, which is an obstacle to the 
resistance, and if it were not there the situation would be entirely different.”89 
D. CONCLUSION 
Creating stable situations is an essential task in counterinsurgency 
operations. The principles and techniques of situational prevention can provide a 
conceptual and technical framework to assist the counterinsurgent in creating 
this stable environment. The three case studies examined in this chapter 
demonstrated that altering the physical environment could reduce the 
opportunities for insurgent violence in terms of effort, risk and rewards of the 
acts.  
These three empirical examples also validate Lewin’s Equation, that 
behavior is a function of a person and the environment. The counterinsurgent 
and society can make changes to the environment, and the insurgent can then 
make rational decisions in response to these changes. This can and often does 
lead to a reduction in violence. 
Situational prevention provides five principles and 25 techniques to 
increase interventions beyond fences and walls. Situational prevention can be 
used as a conceptual framework for systematically analyzing the opportunity  
 
                                            






structures that terrorists and insurgents exploit when committing acts of violence 
or crime, and then makes it possible to find economical and acceptable means to 
block these opportunities.  
Although other measures were taken in conjunction with situational 
prevention techniques in these cases, and displacement of violence and 
adaptation of insurgent tactics sometimes occurred, opportunity reduction 




This research has sought to introduce the theories and techniques of 
situational crime prevention, and then demonstrate their applicability for use in 
counterinsurgency operations. The opportunity theories within criminology 
indicate that insurgent behavior, like all behavior, is a function between the 
person and the environment. Society and the local community can change 
insurgent opportunities, while the individual insurgent makes decisions in 
response to these changes.  Altering the volume of insurgent opportunities at any 
level also produces a change in the outcomes of insurgent activities, in particular, 
violence and crime. 
Recognizing the importance of situational opportunities within the 
operational environment allows for the expansion of current counterinsurgency 
theory and tactics. Counterinsurgency operations do not have to be restricted to 
direct action or abstract concepts, such as winning the support of the population. 
The principles and techniques of situational prevention can be applied to the 
here-and-now of any area of responsibility to manipulate the environmental 
variables that govern insurgent movement, give rise to attack patterns, and 
structure insurgent decisions and choices.90 Application of these techniques 
increase the risk and effort associated with insurgent activities, which can, and 
often does, lead to a rapid and quantifiable reduction in violence.  
Although situational prevention has not been used explicitly as a 
framework for reducing insurgent violence in counterinsurgency operations, the 
principles and techniques are often implemented intuitively when dealing with 
specific types of terrorist or insurgent attacks. The empirical examples cited in 
this research appear to validate Lewin’s Equation, that behavior is a function of  
 
                                            
90 Felson, Clarke and Great Britain, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime 
Prevention, 33. 
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person and the environment. These cases also suggest that opportunity 
reduction may have an independent effect on the overall level of insurgent 
violence.  
The implications of these findings are that the principles and techniques of 
situational prevention can provide a practical means to apply the opportunity 
theories to counterinsurgency operations. Situational crime prevention is a 
strategy that addresses specific crimes, or insurgent violence, by managing, 
designing, and manipulating the environment in a manner that seeks to increase 
the risk to the insurgent, while reducing the insurgent’s anticipated reward for 
committing the act.91 
Situational prevention is a practical approach that focuses on protecting 
the population and securing the environment in which it lives. Situational crime 
prevention is designed to reduce the occurrence and fear of violence while 
improving the quality of people’s lives. As such, the application of situational 
prevention techniques are worthy of consideration when conducting 
counterinsurgency operations.  
Insurgent violence and crime are, in part, a result of situational 
opportunities within the environment.  As such, they depend on the conjunction 
between the insurgents’ motivation (of whatever nature and whatever source) 
and the situational opportunities presented to them within their environment 
(whether defined in terms of risks, efforts or rewards of their acts).92 In 
approaching terrorist and insurgent acts of violence as politically motivated crime, 
they can be prevented or reduced through the principles of situational crime 
prevention, which consists of increasing effort, increasing risk, reducing rewards, 
removing excuses, and reducing provocations.  
                                            
91 Ronald V. Clarke, "Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical 
Scope," 1. 
92 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, 6. 
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This change can be achieved through a continuous process of 
systematically analyzing the opportunity structures that terrorists and insurgents 
exploit when committing acts of violence or crime, and then applying the 
techniques of situational crime prevention to find economical and acceptable 
means to block these opportunities.93 
 
                                            
93 Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists, Preface. 
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